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16 April 1986

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence as a Force Multiplier--Meeting [redacted]  
[redacted] 15 April 1986

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1. [redacted] erstwhile NIO/GPF and now a consultant on "national security affairs." I met with him in my office at my invitation on the suggestion of the current NIO/GPF, General Nichols. Until recently [redacted] was working on some RAND studies which were cut back because of Gramm-Rudman. I asked him for his views about the multiplier concept and how it might be approached in term of the NFIP role and contribution.

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2. [redacted] said that intelligence as a force multiplier is a useful figure of speech--the trick is to find the coefficient to demonstrate that intelligence does "magnify." The greatest opportunity for success in developing the concept is in the area of warfighting. In attempting to achieve real measurements intelligence should be divided into strategic and tactical pieces. The former is the economic and political big picture stuff, and the latter focuses on how the forces of, say, NATO are enhanced by NFIP systems and capabilities. In this connection, RAND is now conducting a study of "information needs of commanders" that includes a series of simulations intended to measure differences in performance, i.e., combat effectiveness (ground gained/lost, number of casualties, etc.) using unrequested and varying kinds and quantities of intelligence.

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3. As for I&W, [redacted] said there were diverse ways of measuring it. He said that warning, in any case, is in the minds of the decisionmakers and that in reality intelligence can only provide a series of what he termed "advisories." Only the decisionmaker is equipped with the "entire picture" and only he is the one who can conclude whether or not "they're coming." The best that intelligence can do is to present the risks, dangers and cogency of the issues--warning is an ongoing process, not an event. For strategic nuclear conflict, [redacted] thought that games could be structured and played to get at the value of particular kinds of intelligence despite the "out-of-the-world" kinds of events that they would cover such as intelligence and pre-emptive attack. And in the area of naval engagements and ASW, intelligence and its value in increasing the attrition radar of Soviet SSBNs and SSNs also could be measured.

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4. [ ] thought that studies of historic military campaigns would be useful especially if they addressed how the battles might have been fought today with support from NFIP systems. 25X1

5. In the end, said [ ] deriving measures of effectiveness ("MOE") clearly should be the goal. The MOE could be used effectively along with the results of various mathematically-shaped simulations in the packaging of the defense and intelligence budgets. Budgeteers usually are engineers who are most comfortable with these data as compared to what is provided in NIEs. The latter are mostly irrelevant in the budget process (see NDU study of the value of NIEs by [ ] 25X1

6. [ ] verbally sketched a "Dear Director" memorandum of the approach that might be taken that appeared to be roughly in line with the draft TOR (which I did not show to him). He commented that the DoD would look at it and likely conclude that it represented a two-year effort. I said I would try to digest his ideas and their applicability and would contact him again as the TOR crystallized. I got the impression that he would be available to at least consult for the project. 25X1

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